
Centre for International
Governance Innovation


WORLD
REFUGEE
COUNCIL



World Refugee Council Research Paper No. 6 – December 2018

Using the Compact Model to Support Host States and Refugee Self-reliance

Nazanin Ash and
Cindy Huang



Centre for International
Governance Innovation



World Refugee Council Research Paper No. 6 – December 2018

Using the Compact Model to Support Host States and Refugee Self-reliance

Nazanin Ash and Cindy Huang

CIGI Masthead

Executive

President [Rohinton P. Medhora](#)
Deputy Director, International Intellectual Property Law and Innovation [Bassem Awad](#)
Chief Financial Officer and Director of Operations [Shelley Boettger](#)
Director of the Global Economy Program [Robert Fay](#)
Director of the International Law Research Program [Oonagh Fitzgerald](#)
Director of the Global Security & Politics Program [Fen Osler Hampson](#)
Director of Human Resources [Laura Kacur](#)
Deputy Director, International Environmental Law [Silvia Maciunas](#)
Deputy Director, International Economic Law [Hugo Perezcano Díaz](#)
Director, Evaluation and Partnerships [Erica Shaw](#)
Managing Director and General Counsel [Aaron Shull](#)
Director of Communications and Digital Media [Spencer Tripp](#)

Publications

Publisher [Carol Bonnett](#)
Senior Publications Editor [Jennifer Goyder](#)
Senior Publications Editor [Nicole Langlois](#)
Publications Editor [Susan Bubak](#)
Publications Editor [Patricia Holmes](#)
Publications Editor [Lynn Schellenberg](#)
Graphic Designer [Melodie Wakefield](#)

For publications enquiries, please contact publications@cigionline.org.

Communications

For media enquiries, please contact communications@cigionline.org.
🐦 [@cigionline](#)

Copyright © 2018 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors.

Research papers are policy documents commissioned by the World Refugee Council from world-renowned experts to help inform the work of the Council and its final recommendations. The measures and concepts in these documents do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Refugee Council.



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-commercial – No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.

Centre for International Governance Innovation and CIGI are registered trademarks.

Centre for International Governance Innovation

67 Erb Street West
Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2
www.cigionline.org

Table of Contents

vi	About the Series
vi	About the Authors
vi	Acronyms and Abbreviations
1	Executive Summary
1	Introduction
3	New Support to Front-line Refugee-hosting Nations
6	Lessons Learned: Jordan and Lebanon
11	Recommendations: Taking a Compact Approach
13	Conclusion
14	Works Cited
18	About CIGI
18	À propos du CIGI
19	About the World Refugee Council
19	À propos du Conseil mondial pour les réfugiés

About the Series

World Refugee Council research papers are policy documents commissioned by the Council from world-renowned experts to help inform the World Refugee Council and its final recommendations. The measures and concepts in these documents do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Refugee Council.

About the Authors

Nazanin Ash is the vice president of policy and advocacy at the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The IRC is a global humanitarian aid organization that offers emergency aid and long-term assistance to people in crisis in more than 40 countries and that resettles refugees in 28 US cities. Nazanin oversees the organization's global policy and advocacy efforts, which draw on the learning and experience of IRC humanitarian and resettlement programming to shape policy and practice. Before joining the IRC, she was a policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, where she focused on aid effectiveness and political and economic reform in the Middle East. Previously, she served as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State, leading the US government's Middle East Partnership Initiative. Her US government experience also includes serving as a member of the Secretary of State's policy-planning staff and roles as chief of staff to the first director of Foreign Assistance, administrator of the US Agency for International Development and White House fellow. Nazanin also worked for ActionAid Kenya, one of the largest rights-based non-governmental organizations in Kenya. She holds an M.P.P. from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a B.A. in political science from Bryn Mawr College.

Cindy Huang is co-director of migration, displacement and humanitarian policy and senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development. She works on issues related to refugees and displacement, fragile and conflict-affected states, gender equality and development effectiveness. Previously, Cindy was deputy vice president for sector operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation, where she led the strategic direction and technical oversight of a

\$2 billion portfolio of social sector investments. She also served in the Obama administration as director of policy of the US State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and as senior adviser to the State Department's counselor and chief of staff. In this latter role, Cindy managed the interagency leadership team of Feed the Future, a presidential initiative launched by a \$3.5 billion, three-year commitment to agricultural development and food security. Cindy has also worked for Doctors Without Borders and the Human Development Center in Pakistan. She has a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley, an M.P.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, and a B.A. in ethics, politics and economics from Yale University.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
GCFE	Global Concessional Financing Facility
ILO	International Labour Organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MCC	Millennial Challenge Corporation
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
RACE	Reaching All Children with Education
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEZs	special economic zones
SMEs	small and medium-sized enterprises
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency

Executive Summary

Traditional financing mechanisms for the global refugee system do not reflect the realities on the ground. Humanitarian assistance is short-term and insufficient to meet needs in protracted crises. Refugees, who are displaced for protracted periods, need access to quality education, jobs and other services that allow them to rebuild, become self-reliant and live in dignity and safety.

Multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, bilateral donors and the private sector are forging new ways to bridge emergency response and a more sustainable development approach. The 2016 Jordan and Lebanon compacts serve as examples where development financing, “beyond-aid” commitments and progress in the policy dialogue, addressing both protection and opportunities for refugees, have converged in support of refugees and host communities. These compacts, and the financing streams that enabled them, are noteworthy because they offer multi-year financing that can facilitate longer-term planning and programs, in a process led by the host governments. This creates an opportunity to align with national development priorities and support national systems to meet the needs of refugees and hosts.

This paper uses the Jordan and Lebanon compacts as case studies to identify best practices and key barriers to achieving the full potential of new development-led financing and approaches. The barriers include an inadequate understanding of refugee needs, and the policy and practical constraints refugees face; ineffective program design that fails to balance short- and longer-term impacts; a lack of robust multi-stakeholder participation, including of refugees; and insufficient understanding of constraints and sustainable means of business engagement. Greater understanding is needed of the public investment, policy changes and mediating mechanisms essential to translating private sector commitment into concrete engagement that aligns with needs on the ground.

Today’s trends of displacement call for new responses by donors, humanitarian and development actors, host governments and the private sector, and compact agreements are a promising model for achieving reform. Drawing on

lessons learned from experiences in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, the authors recommend several protocols to follow in developing compacts and propose two new global governance tools to aid in creating focused, informed, coordinated and transparent host country policy changes that can enable refugee self-reliance.

Introduction

Today’s level of forced displacement — 68.5 million people, including more than 25 million refugees¹ — and the trend of protracted crises threaten stability and security, hard-won development gains and the human potential of millions of refugees around the world. The arrival of more than 1.3 million people on the shores of Europe in 2015 generated social and political tensions, fuelling nationalist parties across the continent and the United Kingdom’s vote to separate from the European Union (Huang and Ash 2017). However, while refugee flows to Europe captured global headlines, it has been and remains low- and middle-income countries facing significant development challenges that host the vast majority of the world’s refugees. Indeed, just 10 countries, with 2.5 percent of global GDP, host half of the world’s refugees, providing services and protection to refugees even as they struggle to meet the needs of their own citizens. And, with 3.5 million refugee children out of school in 2017 (UN Refugee Agency [UNHCR] 2017), few countries allowing refugees to work and displacement now lasting an average of 10 years, the loss of human potential and productivity is immense (Devictor and Do 2016).

The financing mechanisms that have traditionally supported refugees are out of step with realities on the ground. The life-saving assistance prioritized by the humanitarian sector, while critical at the onset of emergencies, falls short as crises endure. Long-term displacement requires more than the provision of food, water, shelter and other emergency interventions. Refugees need access to quality education, jobs and other services that will allow them to rebuild, become self-reliant and live in dignity and safety. Humanitarian financing is also short-term and insufficient. More than 90 percent of humanitarian appeals last longer than

¹ See www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.

three years, and the average length of an appeal is seven years. Yet, most humanitarian funding is allocated in one-year grant cycles, constraining programming for ongoing health, education and economic development needs (Valente and Lasker 2015). Furthermore, humanitarian funding requirements have grown exponentially, increasing 360 percent between 2007 and 2017 (from \$5.1 billion to \$23.5 billion).² Although global funding has increased over the last decade, it has not caught up with needs: the gap between appeals and funding provided has grown from 28 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2017.³

The traditional model of humanitarian response also falls short in protracted crises. Third parties are vital for immediate and urgent service delivery in the first phases of crisis, and for short-term, camp-based refugee response. But more than 60 percent of refugees now live in urban areas and out of camps, making host government service delivery systems — and host government policies related to freedom of movement, legal residency and access to education and formal work — linchpins for self-reliance. Donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both local and international, remain critical partners for long-term response, as they are in supporting overall development in low- and middle-income countries, but their partnership with host governments requires an updated model so that solutions enable refugees and host communities to thrive together.

The year 2016 was a turning point for the international community in moving toward a new model for humanitarian response. As the consequences of the Syrian war were felt acutely in Europe, the international community was spurred into new and unprecedented action. At the centre of several summits in 2016 — the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London, the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul and the Leaders' Summit on Refugees in New York City — was a recognition that existing assistance models do not meet the needs of refugees or their hosts. New actors, including some multilateral development banks and members of the private sector, came to the table, bringing

multi-year financing and innovative solutions to support refugees, local communities and host governments. There was renewed momentum within the international community to modernize humanitarian response in protracted crises, as evidenced through new or revised agreements, including commitments to the Grand Bargain, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the forthcoming Global Compact on Refugees⁴ — all of which hinge on a more coordinated and comprehensive response across the humanitarian ecosystem to trends of long-term displacement and urbanization, as well as to refugee needs for education and the legal right to work.

Moving forward, there is a distinct opportunity for the financing landscape for refugee response to not only look different, but to operate and respond more sustainably and effectively. At the same time, there is a real risk that the sum of reforms by individual actors will not be greater than their parts. Yet, failure cannot be an option when so many lives hang in the balance.

This paper sets out opportunities and challenges of new and existing financing mechanisms and models for responding to refugee crises. It draws heavily on the experiences in Jordan and Lebanon, where many of the new financing mechanisms were first deployed. The paper concludes with recommended protocols and global governance tools that can help host governments, development and humanitarian organizations and agencies, civil society and the private sector leverage new resources and catalyze improvements in the lives and livelihoods of refugees and their host communities.

2 See the response plans and appeals snapshots for 2007 and 2017 at, respectively, <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2007> and <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2017>. All dollar values in this paper are US currency.

3 Ibid.

4 See the commitments at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf, <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration> and www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5b1579427/official-version-draft-3-global-compact-refugees-4-june-2018.html, respectively.

New Support to Front-line Refugee-hosting Nations

A new approach to responding to today's refugee challenge calls for solutions that recognize and respond to the realities of long-term displacement, the central role of host governments, and the need to better coordinate humanitarian and development financing and approaches. It calls for investments in host governments' national development plans and their inclusion of refugee populations. It calls for crowding-in new donors and partners, such as from the private sector, and for different partnerships, including between humanitarian and development actors, donors and host nations, to effectively drive refugee self-reliance and support sustainable economic development for nations and communities hosting large numbers of refugees. It calls for beyond-aid contributions, such as trade concessions, private investment and robust resettlement agreements, to more effectively share responsibility among global actors for what is a global public good.

Most importantly, it calls for new ways to measure improvements in people's lives, ensuring that new models deliver tangible results, focused on the progress refugees and host communities make together. Humanitarian responders — donors, implementers, host governments — must move from counting inputs and outputs — the financing provided or food, supplies and services delivered — to measuring progress in health, education, income and other indicators of well-being and human development for refugees and their hosts.

Although the international community has not yet delivered fully on these necessary shifts, it has started to do things differently. The following section outlines three promising ways the international community is shifting its financing and other support to refugee-hosting countries to promote refugee self-reliance.

New Financing Mechanisms, New Partners, New Models: Opportunities and Challenges

Although the top humanitarian donors have largely remained the same for the past decade, the overall financing landscape is starting to change. New donors and financing mechanisms have emerged

since early 2016. The most significant have been the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCF), which has leveraged more than \$1 billion for middle-income countries, and its \$2 billion IDA18 financing sub-window⁵ for refugee response in low-income countries (GCF 2017). Other development banks — including the Islamic Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank — as well as bilateral government donors, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, are enhancing and complementing projects funded through these two World Bank mechanisms. In addition, new funding platforms, such as Education Cannot Wait (ECW) and the EU Trust Fund for Africa, are providing new resources that can be harnessed to promote refugee self-reliance and support host communities. The ECW, which raised more than \$150 million in its first year and has an ambitious goal of raising \$3 billion by 2020, has made clear its intention to offer multi-year support to educate refugee children and enroll them in school.⁶ The EU Trust Fund for Africa raised an initial €1.8 billion, with a proposed additional €500 million to fund programs in economic development, resilience, migration management, stability and governance in the countries of the EU Migration Partnership Framework (European Commission 2018).

These financing streams and mechanisms are noteworthy for two reasons. First, they recognize the protracted nature of refugee crises and offer multi-year financing that can facilitate longer-term planning and programs. Second, many put host governments in the driver's seat — thereby not only creating an opportunity to align planning and programs with national development priorities and support national systems that can help meet the needs of refugees and host communities both, but also incentivizing host governments to shift to more progressive refugee policies that will enable refugee self-reliance.

However, delivering financing through host governments also runs a risk that aid will not reach refugees, who fall outside the traditional

5 The World Bank's website says that this support "will be provided during the 18th replenishment period (July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2020) under the regional program within IDA, the International Development Association — the World Bank's fund for the poorest. This is in addition to regular allocations for each country's national development." See <http://ida.worldbank.org/financing/replenishments/ida18-overview/ida18-regional-sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities>.

6 See www.educationcannotwait.org/about-ecw/.

state-citizen relationship, and therefore outside existing accountability mechanisms. Financing may also not meet the unique needs of refugees, if it is simply directed to national budgets and development plans. Furthermore, development actors whose clients have traditionally been states and citizens face a range of challenges to effective service delivery and policy dialogue in displacement contexts, including limited expertise operating in environments with security threats; little or no training in conflict analysis; inadequate access to affected populations; and a lack of familiarity with the particular needs of refugee communities, the international legal norms that govern their rights and the dynamics between refugees and host communities.

Crowding-in the Private Sector

From development institutions to low- and middle-income governments, there have been calls to catalyze private sector finance to address a range of development challenges — and there are clear opportunities to encourage greater investment in not only refugee-hosting countries but also refugee-owned and refugee-employing businesses. The private sector has unique capacities — flexible and innovative financing, technical expertise and innovation, networks and policy leverage — that do not exist within a traditional refugee response and can contribute to sustainable and scalable impact.

As companies and investors have become more engaged in development and humanitarian response, their role and approach have started to shift (Huang 2017). In the past, the private sector's role in refugee response focused on giving money or in-kind goods and services to charitable organizations. While donations can be effective if demand-driven, they are often one-off or periodic. In-kind goods and skills transfers also may not prove to be cost-effective because of the money and staff time required to make use of them. In recent years, however, businesses have started to look for ways to leverage their core business to achieve more lasting impact. These activities fall on a spectrum from targeted deployment of demand-driven technical expertise, such as volunteering logistics staff to advise on the delivery of food and medicine, to directly employing refugees and investing in their businesses. Corporate commitments through the White House Call to Action for Private Sector Engagement on the

Global Refugee Crisis⁷ in September 2016, and continued engagement through both the Tent Partnership for Refugees and the IRC's Business Refugee Action Network,⁸ as well as other initiatives, illustrate the private sector's intention to contribute to more sustainable solutions.

Approaching refugees as potential business partners, employees and customers — rather than as aid-dependent consumers — can open avenues for public-private engagement. New initiatives are considering the full range of tools — including trade concessions, tax breaks and de-risking products such as guarantees, insurance and first-loss capital — to help unlock domestic and international private capital. However, incentives designed to help address the refugee crisis are often insufficient to overcome host countries' poor business and investment climates. It is essential that efforts to engage the private sector are not only designed on the basis of a deep understanding of refugee-specific needs, but that they also build upon and accelerate plans and initiatives aimed at fostering inclusive growth.

To date, the private sector has not had sufficient partnership with international or local NGOs and experts with experience working with refugee communities to have developed a deep understanding of refugees' skills, needs and constraints. This specific lack of knowledge and experience can hinder the private sector from identifying and building a pipeline of appropriate investments and partnership opportunities. Several impact investing funds are facing challenges in identifying a robust set of bankable opportunities to generate financial and social returns. Lack of robust public-private partnerships can also impede the promise of companies seeking to hire refugees and include them in their supply chains. In many contexts, private companies will need public support to help ensure that refugee hires have the training and support they need to succeed and that host-government policies allow refugees to work formally and own businesses.

7 See <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/private-sector-participants-call-action>.

8 See www.tent.org/about/ and www.rescue-uk.org/Business.

Recognizing Refugees as Economic Contributors

Countries in the Levant and in some countries in Africa, such as Uganda and Ethiopia, have recognized, or are starting to recognize, the economic benefits of hosting refugees, which can be realized if policies around refugees' freedom of movement, rights to an education and to work, and other protections are in place. Refugees themselves can become their own source of financing when they have access to the labour market, including through contributing to tax revenues and creating jobs for other refugees and hosts. For instance, Syrian entrepreneurs have invested nearly \$334 million into the formal Turkish economy since 2011 (Ucak, Holt and Raman 2017). In Uganda, 21 percent of refugee business owners employ others, and 40 percent of these employees are Ugandan nationals (Betts et al. 2014). In developed country contexts, it takes eight years on average for refugees to become net economic contributors (Evans and Fitzgerald 2017). Given refugees are typically displaced for much longer than this, it behooves host governments to support refugees' integration into local economies in order to eventually reap the benefits.

While international law stipulates that refugees have rights to freedom of movement, to education and to work, many host governments — whether they are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or not — do not enable refugees to fully realize these rights. For example, only about half of the 145 UN member states party to the Convention formally grant refugees the right to work, meaning the other half have declared some reservations; in addition, there are another 45 states that are not signatories and do not grant refugees the right to work (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). Even in countries where refugees may have the full right to engage in formal work, there may be other hindrances to realizing those rights, such as the inability to access financial services or the cost of child care, which could be relieved by policies that, for example, reduce bureaucratic barriers or subsidize costs.

In 2016, several host governments committed to better enabling refugees to realize their rights and improve their access to education and decent jobs. For example, at the Leaders' Summit, Ethiopia, a signatory to the Refugee Convention, committed to improve refugees' access to employment, work permits and education, including through its revised Refugee Proclamation. Earlier that year,

through the Jordan Compact,⁹ the government of Jordan agreed to increase work permits for Syrian refugees and implement second-shift school days — whereby Jordanian children attend school for a half-day in the morning and Syrian children for a half-day in the afternoon. The World Bank's expertise, convening role and new financing mechanisms, as well as the private sector's engagement, have provided important support to the design and implementation of these policy changes. While such initiatives remain the exception, they are promising examples of policy changes that recognize the reality of protracted displacement and the economic benefits that can accrue from greater refugee self-reliance.

Transforming New Support into Outcomes

Increased responsibility sharing to meet the needs of the world's refugees and affected host communities is necessary but not sufficient. The proliferation of actors requires better coordination to ensure there are fewer overlaps and that gaps are filled rather than shifted. Better accountability mechanisms are also needed to ensure intended outcomes for refugees are achieved. As new partners crowd-in and different types of funding are available, greater consideration will also need to be given to the mix of financing mechanisms deployed (for example, grants, loans, private capital sources and de-risking products) and to the mix of recipients of funding (for example, implementing partners, national or local governments). Beyond-aid measures, such as trade concessions, must also be carefully analyzed with respect to potential benefits and costs. It is imperative that new commitments from and partnerships with wealthy nations are not seen as a way for wealthy countries to claim they are doing their fair share. These countries must support refugees through other pathways including, importantly, resettlement. How all these factors and considerations play out among new and traditional actors and in protracted displacement contexts can be examined by looking at the Jordan and Lebanon cases.

⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-compact-new-holistic-approach-between-hashemite-kingdom-jordan-and>.

Lessons Learned: Jordan and Lebanon

The needs in Jordan and Lebanon, as in many other refugee-hosting countries, are vast. Jordan hosts more than 1.3 million Syrians, including 670,000 Syrians registered with the UNHCR as refugees, while Lebanon hosts up to 1.5 million Syrians, with roughly 1.0 million registered with the UNHCR.¹⁰ Both countries host tens of thousands of refugees of other nationalities, as well as hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The costs of hosting refugees are high: Jordan estimates that it spends more than \$2.5 billion annually on refugees — equal to six percent of its GDP and more than a quarter of its annual revenues (Malkawi 2016) — and the Lebanese government estimates that hosting refugees cost \$18 billion from 2011 to 2015 (Perry and Stonestreet 2017). Country response plans have gone underfunded for years; just 65 percent of Jordan’s response plan and 45 percent of Lebanon’s response plan were funded in 2017 (Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 2017; Catholic Agency for Overseas Development [CAFOD] et al. 2018). Although, with the right set of policies, the long-term economic benefits of refugees can be realized, the short-term costs and needs remain high.

Jordan and Lebanon are middle-income economies; however, they are relatively small and fragile. Neither country is able to generate enough job opportunities for its own citizens, let alone for refugee populations, nor are they able to offer quality public services, which have been severely strained by refugee arrivals. Jordan’s economy suffers from a “missing middle” — roughly 75 percent of jobs are in either micro or large enterprises. No one sector in the country is expected to be the clear job-creation engine: over the decade from 2004 to 2014, no public sector had added more than 60,000 jobs and no private sector had added more than 35,000 jobs.¹¹ These challenges have contributed to an unemployment rate of 18.5 percent for Jordanians as of the end of 2017 (CAFOD et al. 2018). Youth unemployment in Jordan was 36 percent in 2017, according to

estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO).¹² Half of unemployed Jordanians have been out of work for more than a year, and 70 percent of Syrian refugees are unable to find employment in sectors where they have job experience.¹³

Lebanon’s economy continues to experience extremely low growth — less than two percent GDP annual growth in recent years — and its external deficit remains one of the largest in the world (World Bank 2017b, 1). Public services such as the country’s national school system and public health clinics, particularly in remote and marginalized communities, are weak and considerably strained. As a result, 70 percent of Lebanese children attend private schools, where the quality of education tends to be higher, leaving low-quality schooling to the most vulnerable (Buckner and Spencer 2016). Lebanon has also experienced a re-emergence of diseases previously controlled, such as measles, mumps and waterborne diarrhea (World Bank 2017a).

The marginalization of refugee communities threatens economic and social progress. For example, the poverty rate among Syrian refugees is triple that of Jordanians overall; Syrian children are six years behind in school due to the crisis; early marriage among refugees has quadrupled; and child labour in Jordan has doubled (Voon 2014; IRC 2017; Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth 2016; ILO 2016). If these issues go unaddressed, it will be impossible to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of eliminating poverty and of ensuring healthy lives, quality education, gender equality and decent work for all.

Compacts to Support Self-reliance among Refugees and Host Communities in Jordan and Lebanon

The Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in February 2016 was a catalyzing moment for new, longer-term financing to support Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon. There was a shared recognition among

10 Latest refugee numbers are available on the UNHCR regional and country portals. See <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>.

11 Estimates are drawn from IRC internal analysis.

12 See <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=JO&view=chart>.

13 From an unpublished 2017 ILO and McKinsey & Company analysis for the IRC Million Jobs Challenge Initiative.

host countries, donors and other actors that the Syrian civil war was unlikely to abate soon, and that refugees in Jordan and Lebanon would therefore likely remain there for the foreseeable future. As a result, participants agreed that the needs of refugees and host communities in the region extended beyond life-saving support and, accordingly, that support from the international community needed to better match the long-term nature of the crisis.

Compact agreements emerged as the approach in Jordan and Lebanon — bringing together donors and development and humanitarian actors under host-country leadership for multi-year agreements to achieve shared objectives for refugees and host communities. Under the compact framework, diverse actors make mutually reinforcing commitments to resources, policy changes and projects designed to achieve a shared vision.

The compact agreements that emerged from the conference, between the governments of Jordan and Lebanon, respectively, with the World Bank and other partners such as the European Union, emphasized investing in pathways to create more job opportunities and improve refugee access to quality education. Initial 2016 pledges to Jordan and Lebanon at the conference in London totalled \$1.8 billion in grants — Jordan being pledged \$1 billion and Lebanon, \$832 million (European Commission 2017). In addition, pledges of concessional loans — loans extended on terms substantially more generous than market loans — totalled \$784 million to Jordan and \$121 million to Lebanon (ibid.). At the Leaders' Summit on Refugees held in September 2016, the two country compact agreements served as frameworks for public and private commitments to improving refugees' self-reliance.

A primary aim of the Jordan Compact is to achieve sustainable livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts, supported by a mix of traditional aid (such as grants and concessional loans) and beyond-aid tools. As of December 2017, the World Bank had disbursed \$517.3 million to Jordan, including \$300 million for an employment opportunities project, \$50 million for a health project and \$200 million for an education project (GCFE 2017). Beyond this financing, the European Union agreed to simplify and relax its rules of origin, to allow tariff-free export and improve and increase access to the EU market for companies operating in Jordan.

Businesses in Jordan's special economic zones (SEZs) are incentivized to employ refugees to benefit from these trade opportunities. Companies in the SEZs can now qualify if the company falls within the 30 percent nationally sourced materials threshold (versus an earlier standard of 60 percent) and if 15 percent of their employees on a *single production line* are Syrian refugees. Originally, the European Union's rules required 15 percent of a company's entire workforce be Syrian refugees in order for the company to qualify; however, due to challenges in hiring and retention, the regulation was changed so that companies can now qualify to export tariff-free per production line. Finally, the Jordanian government also agreed to issue up to 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees (Sweis 2016).

The Lebanon Compact sought to improve access to education for Syrian and Lebanese children, aiming to enroll all children aged five to 17 in school by the end of the 2016-2017 school year (Huang and Ash 2017). The World Bank finalized the second phase of the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE 2) Research-for-Results program, worth \$224 million, including a grant of \$4 million from Norway, Germany and the United States (World Bank 2016a). As of the end of 2017, Lebanon had received about \$25.5 million in concessional financing for that education program, RACE 2, through an exception to draw on IDA, which offers similar concessional financing terms as the GCFE. GCFE funds for forthcoming employment, infrastructure and health projects had not yet been disbursed. The Lebanon Compact includes construction, expansion, rehabilitation and equipment of formal schools; sets out to improve teaching quality and curriculum reform; and includes commitments to invest in improving the country's education data system. Beyond the education sector, GCFE-funded projects were planned for improving Lebanon's roads and employment opportunities, as well as for health care improvements to benefit nationals and Syrian refugees.

In addition to the World Bank's and bilateral donors' support of the two compacts, the private sector has contributed via impact investing, creating training and skills transfer programs and generating gig work opportunities. George Soros pledged \$500 million in investments to support the needs of refugees, migrants and their host communities, and is seeking to make investments in Jordan (Soros 2016). Among the 51

Table 1: Cumulative Work Permits Issued by the Government of Jordan to Syrian Refugees, 2016–2018

	2016		2017		2018 (January–June 19)		Cumulative	
	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
Male	35,675	97	44,345	94.9	19,915	95.8	99,936	95.8
Female	1,115	3	2,372	5.1	872	4.2	4,358	4.2
Total	36,790		46,717		20,787		104,294	

Data sources: Government of Jordan work permit reports for 2016 and 2017; Government of Jordan Ministry of Labour/Jordan Compact Project Management Unit work permit figures for June 2018. See <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/63147>.

private companies that pledged to support and generate opportunities for refugee self-reliance at the Leaders’ Summit in September 2016, four companies — Airbnb, Hewlett-Packard, Lynke and McKinsey & Company — pledged to support livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan, including through skills training, the creation of a tech centre and developing new strategies for generating meaningful job opportunities.¹⁴ In addition, companies such as Western Union have partnered with humanitarian organizations, including the IRC, to test whether on-demand and remote work could provide a new avenue for jobs. IKEA in Jordan has partnered with the Jordan River Foundation to employ both Jordanian and mostly Syrian refugee women in textile production for materials to be made locally and sold (Le Pluart 2017). Beyond large multinational companies, regional and local businesses and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are critical actors in hiring or otherwise supporting refugees. In Jordan, many Syrian refugees are themselves business owners, albeit largely informally, or operating through a partnership agreement with a Jordanian co-owner.

Impact of New Financing: Slow and Uneven Progress

Despite these significant investments, progress and impact have been slow and inconsistent — even accounting for the longer time-horizon of livelihood interventions. Although the Government of Jordan has made significant regulatory and process shifts to ensure refugees can obtain a work permit, it did not reach its goal of 200,000 permits by the end

of 2017, as outlined in the Jordan Compact (see Table 1). Indeed, the government is only halfway toward its goals, with 104,000 permits issued as of June 2018, and it remains unclear how many of these permits are in active use (of the roughly 83,500 permits issued as of February 2018, only 40,000 were active). In addition, just four percent of the permits have been issued to women (CAFOD et al. 2018). Beyond the permits, as of late 2017, only four companies had qualified for the relaxed rules of origin in the SEZs, and it took more than 18 months for their first shipments to be exported to Belgium, Cyprus, Spain and Hungary. Impact investors such as Open Society Foundation have not yet publicly reported deployment of significant capital. The pipeline of projects that involve refugees and can deliver near-market returns and social impact is extremely limited. Broader improvements in the business environment will be needed to attract private investment, including from impact investing funds. Globally, only 16 percent of impact investors are seeking to invest at returns significantly below market rates, reflecting some limitations on the supply of capital available on high-risk, low-return terms.

In Lebanon, although the number of Syrian refugee children enrolled in school had reached 200,000 by the start of the 2017-2018 academic year, many more still were not enrolled. To give a sense of the proportions, at the end of the 2016-2017 academic year, fully 58 percent of school-aged refugee children were not in school (ibid.). Furthermore, although early policies prohibiting informal education programs have since been reversed, continued regulations on where community-based and other informal education programs can take place and who can provide them have slowed the scaling up of these numbers and continued to

¹⁴ See www.concordia.net/the-summit-2016/the-private-sector-forum-on-migration-and-refugees/.

limit access (El-Ghali, Ghalayini and Ismail 2016). More broadly, a number of education projects planned for Lebanon are yet to be approved by the government — stalling progress on both disbursement of funds and project implementation.

This slow and uneven progress has been the consequence of a combination of various factors, including the following.

Insufficient understanding of refugee needs and constraints: Responses in both Jordan and Lebanon suffered from a misalignment with refugees' lived experiences and unique vulnerabilities. This stemmed, in part, from a misunderstanding or an insufficient understanding of not only refugees' needs but also the policy and other practical barriers to accessing labour markets and public services such as schools.

Although the aims of the Jordan Compact are important benchmarks to reach — in particular, the targets for refugee work permits and strong focus on supporting host communities as well as refugees — several critical needs and constraints specific to the refugee population were overlooked or inadequately addressed. The right to entrepreneurship and owning a business remains out of reach for Syrians in Jordan, undercutting those refugees currently operating informal businesses, leaving them vulnerable to blackmail from Jordanian business partners or at risk of being found out by Jordanian authorities. For refugees running their own businesses informally, a lack of access to financing, savings accounts and other financial infrastructure can limit business sustainability and growth. The right to own a business and formalize existing businesses may be particularly important in the home-based business case for women refugees, who often face barriers to leaving their home, such as lack of child care, safety concerns and cultural norms. The compact agreement committed to investigate options for regularizing refugee-owned businesses, but substantial progress remains to be seen.

Work permits initially required employers to sponsor and apply for an employee to receive a permit, effectively tying Syrian workers to a single employer and disqualifying any refugees working for employers who are either not themselves formal businesses or not willing to pay for accompanying fees. One survey found that 89 percent of Syrian refugee respondents in Jordan wanted to apply for work permits, but only 26 percent thought

their employers would be willing to sponsor them (ILO, World Bank and UNHCR 2017). Formalizing workers requires employers to adhere to Ministry of Labour standards and inspections, adding costs and oversight, which employers may not want to take on. That said, these standards and policies are crucial for improving the quality of jobs.

In the second half of 2017, new permit types opened up in construction and agriculture sectors, granting refugee permit-holders mobility between employers. This mobility — which should be extended to additional, and ultimately all, sectors — enables greater protections, because refugee employees can now leave abusive or exploitative employers while maintaining their work permits. This shift indicates some willingness from the Jordanian government to respond to lessons learned and to adapt approaches to create better solutions within the compact. There is room for further policy changes and refinements in areas beyond work permits, including around business formalization and permit policies that are more responsive to market and labour realities (for example, for additional sectors and job types).

The emphasis of the permit process has been on formalizing existing workers rather than on creating new jobs for and hiring additional refugees and Jordanians. In the SEZs, where employers are incentivized to create jobs and hire more refugees to access the European market, the constraints on refugees were inadequately acknowledged. Work in factories is often difficult to reach logistically for refugees living in Amman or other host cities, and access is also difficult for refugees in the camps, who need permission to leave. Factory work in the SEZs often goes to migrant workers who live on-site and who are willing to work long hours. For Syrian refugees, issues of child care and inability or unwillingness to live on-campus at the factories pose challenges to their participation in these jobs.

Program design not sufficiently driven by the right goals, evidence and balance of short- and longer-term impacts: The targets agreed to by the World Bank and Jordanian and Lebanese governments primarily focused on outputs (for example, number of permits issued by the Government of Jordan, number of school-aged children enrolled in formal schools in Lebanon), rather than outcomes (such as jobs secured, income or poverty levels, math and reading levels), contributing to insufficient analysis of, and

attention to, the investments and policy changes necessary for success (World Bank 2016b; 2016c).

In addition, some of the interventions selected did not strongly reflect evidence of what works. For example, trade concessions and SEZs — two areas that received the greatest attention in the Jordan Compact — have a mixed overall record, especially in advancing quality employment opportunities for vulnerable or marginalized populations (Gordon 2017). They are also interventions that are unlikely to generate outcomes in the near term. A more robust review of the evidence could have revealed that cash grants to support entrepreneurs, policy changes to enable access to financial services, greater freedom of movements and an easing of regulatory constraints to formalizing home-based and other informal businesses could have had more immediate impact (Hunt, Samman and Mansour-Ille 2017). Likewise, the Lebanon Compact focused on creating double-shift school days and constructing new or rehabilitating existing schools — neither of which has shown significant evidence of impact on learning outcomes. By not evaluating the evidence base, the government and its partners missed an opportunity to deploy community-based education programs, which have shown strong evidence of increasing access to schools, for girls in particular, and improving learning outcomes (Burde et al. 2015). While investing in solutions that will generate benefits for refugees and host communities in the longer term — such as creating new factories and constructing schools or health clinics — is an important part of the response in protracted displacement contexts, these investments need to be balanced with solutions that will drive outcomes and meet needs in the immediate term.

Lack of robust multi-stakeholder participation (and consequent undermining of effective analysis and planning): The lack of inclusion of civil society, local and international NGOs, local authorities and the private sector in analysis and planning processes contributed to suboptimal outcomes. Leaving refugees and host populations out of the consultation process can, as outlined above, lead to a misalignment between people's needs and constraints and the interventions selected for investment. A more consultative process integrating local populations, or stakeholders who work closely with them, may have illuminated barriers for refugees seeking decent formal work opportunities in

Jordan, including concerns over safety and the costs of travel from the home to work, lack of affordable child care and a desire for same-gender supervisors, especially for female refugees (Gordon 2017). Similarly, without engaging municipal authorities, operational constraints to delivering on new policies and implementing new programs at the local level are unlikely to be factored into the decision-making process — meaning, in practice, global or national mandates may not ultimately be delivered or may be duplicative of local solutions already being implemented (Saliba 2018). For instance, in Jordan, the Jordan Response Plan¹⁵ serves to guide the response to the crisis at a national level; however, the plan has not meaningfully engaged municipal authorities, and funding streams have not been coordinated through the Greater Amman Municipality. In some cases, this has led to international NGOs operating community centres near those operated by the municipal authority.

Insufficient understanding of the constraints to engaging the private sector and sustaining global business support for refugee and host communities: Despite strong interest and commitment from the private sector, there is insufficient understanding of the support and mediating mechanisms required to translate commitment into concrete engagement that aligns with needs on the ground. For example, unlocking impact investment will require partnerships with private sector companies, governments or organizations that work directly with refugees (or a combination of these) to promote additional policy reforms and develop a pipeline of companies that seek to advance refugees' and hosts' well-being, while also generating profit. Greater consultation with the private sector and additional analysis on local labour market dynamics could have helped refine the design of the SEZ initiative. For example, tax concessions for multinational companies to incentivize investment in Jordan might have been an effective and faster way to mobilize new private investment and employ refugees.

Including refugees in hiring and supply chains is one of the more promising inroads for private sector engagement. Moving beyond corporate social responsibility and toward engagement from a core business perspective can increase the sustainability of global business support

¹⁵ See www.jrpsc.org/.

to forcibly displaced populations. Hiring and supplying from refugee-hiring and refugee-owned suppliers can support refugees and host communities alike, building private investment in a community and creating new livelihood opportunities. While there are barriers to private sector investment in many of the developing refugee-hosting countries — and in the case of Jordan, this includes a challenging regulatory environment, a high business tax rate and limited natural resources — greater research and analysis of the barriers and how to overcome them in individual-country contexts can open pathways for global business investment, reaping immense rewards for the durable support of refugees and host communities. Operational and practical constraints impact not only multinationals, but also regional and national businesses, as well as SMEs. Broadening the consultative process to reach the multiple levels of private sector actors can help to better identify barriers — policy-driven and otherwise — that could then be mitigated to unlock significant economic potential to benefit refugees and host community members alike.

Recommendations: Taking a Compact Approach

Dialogue and decisions around using public and private capital to support refugees' needs is undoubtedly politically sensitive, especially in low- and middle-income countries where the needs of host populations are often not being adequately met. Furthermore, financing to host governments to support refugee populations requires a different accountability structure, as refugees fall outside of traditional government-citizen accountability mechanisms and therefore typical donor-host government financing agreements. Policy reforms that can mobilize new resources and catalyze the scale-up of livelihood opportunities are also not easy to implement, even when political will exists. However, if space is created to advance necessary reforms and make decisions about financing, hosting refugees can prove to be an opportunity rather than a costly endeavour.

Compact models have real promise for organizing the right set of decision makers, under host

country leadership and with shared objectives, clearly defined contributions from all parties and clearly defined metrics for success. Well-designed compacts can systematically ground host governments, humanitarian and development actors and the private sector in best practices for refugee response, such as defining outcomes; developing protocols for joint analysis and planning and multi-stakeholder engagement; and using data and evidence to drive decisions around investments in a portfolio of interventions. Compacts can also help bring together the right set of decision makers to help break through the political and bureaucratic constraints and overcome policy barriers that can otherwise derail good intentions. As well, they can align incentives, drive mutual accountability and unlock private investment to deliver real outcomes for refugees and host communities — thereby making the most out of both new and existing financing committed to addressing the crisis of protracted displacement.

However, the compact model is not without its flaws, and it is not suitable for every refugee context. Eligibility criteria for a compact agreement should consider whether the host government is party to an active conflict that caused the refugees' displacement; whether the country hosts a threshold number of long-term refugees; and if the host country is willing to make legal, policy and regulatory changes that will support the increased inclusion of refugees into its public services and the local economy. Other considerations, which will be context-dependent, include the presence of high-level commitment from several international partners and the amount and type of financing or beyond-aid commitments that may be available. In the select cases where refugee-hosting countries have debt sustainability issues, such as in Jordan, the International Monetary Fund and other relevant actors should be engaged to ensure that a compact with concessional loans does not exacerbate the situation (Plant 2018).

While refugee compacts as seen in Jordan and Lebanon are the first of their kind, other funding compacts for complex crises serve as good examples for successes and lessons learned. For instance, the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) compacts, aimed at reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth, have delivered successful programs in many countries (Rose and Wiebe 2015). Evidence of successful MCC compacts has pointed to the model's

potential to create incentives for policy reform, put governments in the lead and implement a multi-stakeholder consultation and decision-making process. Another example to draw on is the five-year compact agreement in Afghanistan to improve “security, economic development and counter-narcotics efforts” (UN Security Council 2006) and align the work of the international community with government-led efforts to repair, rebuild and re-stabilize the war-torn country. In this case, an insufficient understanding of practical and policy constraints to implementing the compact led to misalignment between needs on the ground and investment priorities. As a result, progress stagnated and efforts failed to significantly improve conditions (Bennett et al. 2009).

These past and current experiences show that improvements in policy and practice can better draw out the potential of compact approaches to leverage new resources and catalyze impact. The recommendations below, both for specific protocols that should be adopted within compact approaches and for new global governance mechanisms that can support strategic shifts in the humanitarian sector, should be implemented by a diverse range of actors — host governments, donors, development and humanitarian organizations and agencies, civil society and the private sector — and should be considered by the UNHCR and partners as they implement the Global Compact on Refugees.

Five New Protocols for Compact Development

Define clear, measurable and context-specific outcomes through joint analysis and planning.

Distinct time-bound, measurable outcome targets for refugees and host communities should be identified through joint analysis and planning, led by the host government and including a range of host and refugee stakeholders, as well as the private sector. These targets and outcomes for refugees should be designed by drawing on the United Nations’ SDGs and form the basis of a results framework that transparently evaluates the impact or success of new financing streams. This protocol will ensure that the country’s targets and outcomes for refugees align with complementary development aims that the country, as well as the broader UN and international community, is pursuing. In particular, in cases where a host government is taking on additional loans from multilateral development

banks, clear alignment on outcomes for both host communities and refugees is key to social cohesion and overall development progress.

Institute a transparent and standardized method to identify barriers to refugees’ economic and social inclusion. Financing must support and be accompanied by clear commitments from host governments to ensure that their policies enable refugee access to jobs and public services such as education. Addressing existing policy and practical barriers head-on will help to ensure that programming and interventions have maximum effect. Creating a transparent process and using standardized assessment tools can help depoliticize the process of identifying constraints and policy reforms. This protocol can also reinforce stakeholders’ mutually beneficial interests in driving changes to achieve agreed-on outcomes.

Take a portfolio approach. Financing should support a portfolio of interventions that is balanced in terms of addressing the short- and long-term needs of refugees and host communities and the barriers they face (for example, it should consider timing to impact and the beneficiary mix). The portfolio should also be based on evidence of what works; new, innovative or riskier interventions should be balanced with investments in programs that have been rigorously evaluated and have proven they can lead to outcomes.

Systematize formal structures for inclusive stakeholder engagement. Multi-stakeholder governing or advisory boards for financing and related programming, led by the government and inclusive of humanitarian and development actors, civil society and the private sector, can help ensure that financial, beyond-aid and in-kind support to host countries responds to the actual needs and constraints of impacted communities. Such a multi-stakeholder board can also serve not only as an accountability mechanism, potentially collecting data and analyzing progress against agreed-on outcomes, but also as a formal, consistent way for various constituencies to provide feedback to key decision makers.

Create country-level platforms to bring together multinational and local private sector entities, with other local partners. It is public and private actors on the ground who have the ability to match business and investment opportunities with specific refugee employees and enterprises, and to help them identify and overcome policy and

practical barriers to refugee inclusion. Country-level platforms can convene stakeholders to develop a shared understanding of each other's needs and expectations, facilitate partnership development, advance policy dialogue and hold partners accountable to their commitments. Diagnostic tools can help with market analysis and identify core business opportunities, and an associated learning and evaluation initiative can facilitate productive private sector engagement and ensure that lessons learned and best practices are shared. As country-level platforms mature, it could be helpful to create regional dialogues or platforms to share opportunities and lessons more broadly.

Two New Global Governance Tools

Create a refugee policy index. The World Bank, the United Nations and other critical stakeholders should jointly develop an index that evaluates, on an annual basis, countries' policies related to refugees and the legal, physical and material status of refugees relative to host communities. In the absence of standardized, transparent approaches and tools to analyze what legal and policy barriers exist, analyses of needs and constraints are done in a fragmented and ad hoc way, resulting in each stakeholder pushing for different policy changes based on the limited scope of its own, individual analysis and political constraints. Without an objective or standard way to evaluate host countries' refugee policies, negotiations around policy changes will remain highly subjective and difficult. Further, in the absence of a framework with a common set of indicators for analyzing refugee well-being, there could be situations in which a host country's laws support refugee rights — for example, the right to education — but those rights cannot be realized due to other policy constraints — for example, that refugees can only attend certain schools in certain areas or at certain times. A universal index that includes de jure and de facto indicators would increase transparency, by systematically making data available and highlighting key areas for reform, while adhering to necessary data privacy protocols.

This proposed refugee policy index would distinguish itself from existing indices by honing in on policies that are directly tied to refugee self-reliance, such as those related to refugees' access to jobs, banking, education and other social services. This focus would align with the international

community's renewed attention and committed resources to promote refugee self-reliance.

Establish a data and evidence alliance. A formal agreement between the World Bank, regional banks, UN agencies and other relevant technical experts should be developed to:

- identify critical gaps both in data (for example, socio-economic data of affected populations) and in evidence of which interventions work to improve the lives and livelihoods of refugees and host communities;
- outline protocols and frameworks for sharing data;
- conduct regular reviews of evidence to inform program design;
- create standardized tools to compare proposed interventions against available evidence; and
- provide technical guidance to establish common standards for costing analyses.

As a step in this direction, the World Bank and the UNHCR announced plans to open a joint data centre to strengthen data collection and analysis around displaced populations, and in April 2018 signed the memorandum of understanding to move forward. The planned centre will contribute to increased transparency of displacement data, which could help to ensure that policy and program decisions are data- and evidence-based. The data centre should expand its mandate and cover the critical data and evidence needs listed above. It should also serve as the place to define a set of shared outcomes and context-specific targets for improving the well-being of refugees and host communities, in particular, as they relate to the UNHCR's Global Compact on Refugees and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.

Conclusion

Today's trends of displacement call for a new response by the refugee regime — one that adequately addresses the realities of the long-term nature of displacement and its implications for the low- and middle-income countries that host most refugees — and a strengthened accountability

mechanism to ensure that refugees and their host communities can thrive together. Donors, humanitarian and development actors, host governments and the private sector need to work in new and different ways. Financing needs to not only be provided to host governments and other partners in multi-year tranches to support longer-term solutions and programming, but also to be leveraged to support host country policy changes that can enable refugee self-reliance. Otherwise, there is a risk that new financing will not have the impact expected or, more importantly, needed. Compacts are a promising model for achieving these reforms.

The Global Compact on Refugees, shepherded by the UNHCR, can serve as a foothold for new governance structures and practice changes. But the true test will lie in the compact's implementation at the regional and country levels. Current country compact agreements must be closely monitored to ensure they are meeting targets and achieving outcomes, and can quickly course-correct as needed. New and emerging compact agreements, learning from past and ongoing experiences in countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, have an opportunity to get it right from the start.

Works Cited

- Bennett, Jon, Jane Alexander, Douglas Saltmarsh, Rachel Phillipson and Peter Marsden. 2009. *Country Programme Evaluation: Afghanistan*. Evaluation Report EV696, May. London, UK: UK Department for International Development. www.oecd.org/countries/afghanistan/47107291.pdf.
- Betts, Alexander, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan and Naohiko Omata. 2014. *Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions*. Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/refugeeeconomies.
- Buckner, Elizabeth and Dominique Spencer. 2016. "Educating Syrian Refugees in Lebanon." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4. <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/63513>.
- Burde, Dana, Ozen Guven, Jo Kelcey, Heddy Lahmann and Khaled Al-Abbadi. 2015. *What Works to Promote Children's Educational Access, Quality of Learning, and Wellbeing in Crisis-Affected Contexts*. New York University, Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, UKaid, October. <http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/Education-emergencies-rigorous-review-2015-10.pdf>.
- CAFOD, ActionAid, Human Appeal, Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, CARE, Caritas, Christian Aid, Mercy Corps, Action Against Hunger USA, People in Need, Médecins du Monde, Oxfam, IRC, Save the Children, World Vision, Dorcas Aid International, Finn Church Aid, Bibliothèques Sans Frontières, Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum and Jordan INGO Forum. 2018. *Promise to Practice: Following through on commitments to support the future of Syria and the region*. March 18. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Promise%20to%20Practice_Online.pdf.
- Devictor, Xavier and Do, Quy-Toan. 2016. "How many years have refugees been in exile?" Policy Research Working Paper WPS7810. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/549261472764700982/How-many-years-have-refugees-been-in-exile>.

- El-Ghali, Hana A., Nadine Ghalayini and Ghida Ismail. 2016. "Responding to Crisis: Syrian Refugee Education in Lebanon." American University of Beirut Policy Institute Policy Brief No. 7, March. Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut. http://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/policy_memos/2015-2016/20160406_responding_to_crisis.pdf.
- European Commission. 2017. "Supporting Syria and the region: Post-Brussels conference financial tracking: Report Four." Supporting Syria & the Region Conference, Brussels 2017. European Commission, October. www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23917/supporting-syria-and-the-region_post-brussels-conference-financial-track.pdf.
- . 2018. "Protecting and supporting migrants and refugees: new actions worth €467 million under the EU Trust Fund for Africa." European Commission press release, May 29. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3968_en.htm.
- Evans, William N. and Daniel Fitzgerald. 2017. *The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States: Evidence from the ACS*. National Bureau of Economic Research. www.nber.org/papers/w23498.
- GCFF. 2017. *Global Concessional Financing Facility: 2016-2017 Annual Report*. World Bank Group. https://globalcffi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/GCFF-Annual%20Report_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf.
- Gordan, Grant. 2017. *Solving the Refugee Employment Problem in Jordan: A Survey of Syrian Refugees*. IRC. www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/1527/irc-syrianrefugeeemployment-72dpi-041117.pdf.
- Huang, Cindy. 2017. *Global Business and Refugee Crises: A Framework for Sustainable Engagement*. Center for Global Development and Tent Foundation, September. www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/global-business-and-refugee-crises.pdf.
- Huang, Cindy and Nazanin Ash. 2017. *Refugee Compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement*. Center for Global Development, April. www.cgdev.org/publication/refugee-compacts-addressing-the-crisis-of-protracted-displacement.
- Hunt, Abigail, Emma Samman and Dina Mansour-Ille. 2017. *Syrian women refugees in Jordan: opportunity in the gig economy?* London, UK: IRC and Overseas Development Institute. www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11742.pdf.
- ILO. 2016. "Child labour doubles in Jordan since 2007 — Survey." ILO press release, August 16. www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_510750/lang--en/index.htm.
- ILO, World Bank and UNHCR. 2017. "Periodic Analysis of Syrian Workers in Jordan, October 2017." International Labour Organization, World Bank and UNHCR Factsheet, October. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Periodic%20Analysis%20of%20Syrian%20Workers%20in%20Jordan%20-%20Factsheet%20Final.pdf>.
- IRC. 2017. "Impact of war on Syrian children's learning: testing shows gaps in literacy and math skills." IRC, March. www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/1434/education-reportlearninglevelssyrianchildrenfinal.pdf.
- Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. 2017. "JRP 2017 Financial Status." Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/5a89533aec212d1cb494777c/1518949181969/2017+Financial+Update.pdf>.
- Le Pluart, Joanna. 2017. "A new life for refugees." IKEA press release, 2017. www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/this-is-ikea/ikea-highlights/2017/a-new-life-for-refugees/index.html.
- Malkawi, Khetam. 2016. "Syrian refugees cost Kingdom \$2.5 billion a year — report." *The Jordan Times*, February 6. www.jordantimes.com/news/local/syrian-refugees-cost-kingdom-25-billion-year-%E2%80%94-report.
- Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth. 2016. "New study finds child marriage rising among most vulnerable Syrian refugees." UN Envoy News for Youth, February 8. www.un.org/youthenvoy/2017/02/new-study-finds-child-marriage-rising-among-vulnerable-syrian-refugees/.

- Perry, Tom and John Stonestreet. 2017. "Lebanon near 'breaking point' over Syrian refugee crisis: PM Hariri." *Reuters World News*, March 31. www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon/lebanon-near-breaking-point-over-syrian-refugee-crisis-pm-hariri-idUSKBN1722JM.
- Plant, Mark. 2018. "Refugee Spending and the Macroeconomic Program in Jordan." Center for Global Development Notes, June 28. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. www.cgdev.org/publication/refugee-spending-and-macroeconomic-program-jordan.
- Rose, Sarah and Franck Wiebe. 2015. "Focus on Policy Performance: MCC's Model in Practice." MCC Monitor Analysis, January 27. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/focus-policy-mcc-brief.pdf.
- Saliba, Samer. 2018. *From Response to Resilience, Working with Cities and City Plans to Address Urban Displacement: Lessons from Amman and Kampala*. New York, NY: IRC. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fromresponsetoresiliencefinalweb.pdf>.
- Soros, George. 2016. "Why I'm Investing \$500 Million in Migrants." *Wall Street Journal*, September 20. www.wsj.com/articles/why-im-investing-500-million-in-migrants-1474344001.
- Sweis, Rana F. 2016. "Jordan Struggles Under a Wave of Syrian Refugees." *New York Times*, February 13. www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/world/middleeast/jordan-syria-refugees.html?_r=0.
- Ucak, Selen, Jennifer P. Holt and Kavya Raman. 2017. "Another Side to the Story: A market assessment of Syrian SMEs in Turkey." New York, NY: Building Markets. https://buildingmarkets.org/sites/default/files/pdm_reports/another_side_to_the_story_a_market_assessment_of_syrian_smes_in_turkey.pdf.
- UN Security Council. 2006. "Security Council unanimously endorses five-year 'Afghanistan Compact' aimed at bolstering security, development, counter-narcotics efforts." UN press release SC/8641, February 15. www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8641.doc.htm.
- UNHCR. 2017. "Over 3.5 million refugee children miss out on school, report finds." UNHCR News, September 12. www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2017/9/59b65d3b4/35-million-refugee-children-miss-school-report-finds.html.
- Valente, Rodolpho and Romano Lasker. 2015. "An end in sight: Multi-year planning to meet and reduce humanitarian needs in protracted crises." UN OCHA Policy and Study Series Think Brief No. 015, July. www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/An%20end%20in%20sight%20Multi%20Year%20Planning.pdf.
- Voon, Frances. 2014. *Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014*. Amman, Jordan: UNHCR. www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/54b685079/living-shadows-jordan-home-visits-report-2014.html.
- World Bank. 2016a. "US\$224 Million More to Support the Lebanese Education System." World Bank, September 27. www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/09/27/us224-million-more-to-support-the-lebanese-education-system.
- . 2016b. "International Development Association Program Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit In the Amount of SDR 71.8 Million with Co-Financing From the Lebanon Syrian Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Results in Education for All Children Trust Fund." Education Global Practice, Middle East and North Africa. Report No. 108014-LB, September 2. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/980641475200856910/text/Lebanon-RACE2-PforR-Board-Package-PAD-WB-9-5-16-09072016.txt>.
- . 2016c. "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association Program Appraisal Document on Proposed Loan and Credit in the Amount of US\$300 Million to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees Program-for-Results." Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice, Middle East and North Africa Region. Report No. 108201-JO, September 2. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/802781476219833115/pdf/Jordan-PforR-PAD-P159522-FINAL-DISCLOSURE-10052016.pdf>.

———. 2017a. “International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Financing in the Amount of US\$120 Million... to the Lebanese Republic for a Lebanon Health Resilience Project.” World Bank, Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice, Middle East and North Africa Region. Report No. PAD2358, June 13. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/616901498701694043/pdf/Lebanon-Health-PAD-PAD2358-06152017.pdf>.

———. 2017b. “Lebanon [country report].” World Bank, October. <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/866011507054530081/MEM-Oct2017-Lebanon-ENG.pdf>.

Zetter, Roger and Héloïse Ruaudel. 2016. “Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets: An Assessment (Part I: Synthesis).” Washington, DC: The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) Working Paper and Study Series. www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/KNOMAD%20Study%201%20Part%20I-%20Assessing%20Refugees%27%20Rights%20to%20Work_final.pdf.

About CIGI

We are the Centre for International Governance Innovation: an independent, non-partisan think tank with an objective and uniquely global perspective. Our research, opinions and public voice make a difference in today's world by bringing clarity and innovative thinking to global policy making. By working across disciplines and in partnership with the best peers and experts, we are the benchmark for influential research and trusted analysis.

Our research programs focus on governance of the global economy, global security and politics, and international law in collaboration with a range of strategic partners and support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario, as well as founder Jim Balsillie.

À propos du CIGI

Au Centre pour l'innovation dans la gouvernance internationale (CIGI), nous formons un groupe de réflexion indépendant et non partisan doté d'un point de vue objectif et unique de portée mondiale. Nos recherches, nos avis et nos interventions publiques ont des effets réels sur le monde d'aujourd'hui car ils apportent de la clarté et une réflexion novatrice pour l'élaboration des politiques à l'échelle internationale. En raison des travaux accomplis en collaboration et en partenariat avec des pairs et des spécialistes interdisciplinaires des plus compétents, nous sommes devenus une référence grâce à l'influence de nos recherches et à la fiabilité de nos analyses.

Nos programmes de recherche ont trait à la gouvernance dans les domaines suivants : l'économie mondiale, la sécurité et les politiques mondiales, et le droit international, et nous les exécutons avec la collaboration de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et le soutien des gouvernements du Canada et de l'Ontario ainsi que du fondateur du CIGI, Jim Balsillie.

About the World Refugee Council

There are more than 21 million refugees worldwide. Over half are under the age of 18. As a growing number of these individuals are forced to flee their homelands in search of safety, they are faced with severe limitations on the availability and quality of asylum, leading them to spend longer in exile today than ever before.

The current refugee system is not equipped to respond to the refugee crisis in a predictable or comprehensive manner. When a crisis erupts, home countries, countries of first asylum, transit countries and destination countries unexpectedly find themselves coping with large numbers of refugees flowing within or over their borders. Support from the international community is typically ad hoc, sporadic and woefully inadequate.

Bold Thinking for a New Refugee System

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is leading a consensus-driven effort to produce a new Global Compact on Refugees in 2018. The World Refugee Council (WRC), established in May 2017 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, is intended to complement its efforts.

The WRC seeks to offer bold strategic thinking about how the international community can comprehensively respond to refugees based on the principles of international cooperation and responsibility sharing. The Council is comprised of thought leaders, practitioners and innovators drawn from regions around the world and is supported by a research advisory network.

The WRC will explore advances in technology, innovative financing opportunities and prospects for strengthening existing international law to craft and advance a strategic vision for refugees and the associated countries.

The Council will produce a final report grounded by empirical research and informed by an extensive program of outreach to governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society.

À propos du Conseil mondial pour les réfugiés

Il y a en ce moment dans le monde plus de 21 millions de réfugiés, et plus de la moitié d'entre eux ont moins de 18 ans. En outre, de plus en plus de personnes sont forcées de quitter leur pays natal et partent à la recherche d'une sécurité, et elles sont alors confrontées aux limites importantes qui existent quant aux possibilités d'accueil et à la qualité de ce dernier. À cause de cette situation, les réfugiés passent maintenant plus de temps que jamais auparavant en exil.

En ce moment, le système de protection des réfugiés ne permet pas de réagir adéquatement à la crise des réfugiés d'une façon planifiée et globale. Quand une crise éclate, les pays de premier asile, les pays de transit et les pays de destination finale se retrouvent sans l'avoir prévu à devoir composer avec un grand nombre de réfugiés qui arrivent sur leur territoire, le traversent ou en partent. Et le soutien fourni dans ce contexte par la communauté internationale est en règle générale ponctuel, irrégulier et nettement inadéquat.

Des idées audacieuses pour un nouveau système de protection des réfugiés

Le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) dirige des efforts découlant d'un consensus et visant à instaurer un nouveau « pacte mondial pour les réfugiés » en 2018. Mis sur pied en mai 2017 par le Centre pour l'innovation dans la gouvernance internationale (CIGI), le Conseil mondial pour les réfugiés (CMR) veut compléter ces efforts.

Le CMR vise à proposer une réflexion stratégique audacieuse sur la manière dont la communauté internationale peut réagir de façon globale aux déplacements de réfugiés, et ce, en se fondant sur les principes de la coopération internationale et du partage des responsabilités. Formé de leaders, de praticiens et d'innovateurs éclairés provenant de toutes les régions du globe, le CMR bénéficie du soutien d'un réseau consultatif de recherche.

Le CMR examinera les progrès techniques, les occasions de financement novatrices ainsi que les possibilités pour ce qui est de renforcer le droit international et d'y intégrer une vision stratégique pour les réfugiés et les pays concernés.

Par ailleurs, le CMR produira un rapport final fondé sur des recherches empiriques et sur les résultats d'un vaste programme de sensibilisation ciblant les gouvernements, les organisations intergouvernementales et la société civile.

Centre for International Governance Innovation

67 Erb Street West
Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2
www.cigionline.org

 @cigionline